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In the U.S., households participate in two very different types of credit
markets. Personal lending is characterized by continuous risk-based pricing in
which lenders offer households a continuous distribution of borrowing
possibilities based on estimates of their creditworthiness. This contrasts
sharply with mortgage markets where lenders specialize in specific risk
categories of borrowers and mortgage supply is stepwise linear. The contrast
between continuous lending for personal loans and discrete lending by
specialized lenders for mortgage credit has led to concerns regarding the
efficiency and equity of mortgage lending.
This paper sheds both theoretical and empirical light on the differences
in the two credit markets. The theory section demonstrates why, in a
perfectly competitive credit market where all lenders have the same
underwriting technology, mortgage credit supply curves are stepwise linear
and lenders specialize in prime or subprime lending. The empirical section
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then provides evidence that borrowers are being effectively sorted based on
risk characteristics by the market.

1. Introduction
This paper is motivated by two stylized facts that distinguish the
market for personal credit from the mortgage credit market. First,
there are fundamental differences in the credit supply function
between personal loan markets and mortgage markets. U.S.
households face a continuous supply of personal credit from lenders.
That is, individual lenders offer personal loans and revolving credit at
rates that reflect the continuous distribution of consumer credit risk in
the market. In contrast, mortgage credit is split into “prime” and
“subprime” markets in which lenders specialize and the effective credit
supply function is stepwise linear. The more or less continuous pricing
of credit in personal loan markets contrasts with mortgage markets
where price increases as a step function of credit risk. Within each step
of these mortgage markets, there is substantial cross subsidy between
the best and worst risks.
For example, IndyMac Bank provides borrowers with a menu of
risk classifications (level 1 through level 5) to choose from. Level 1,
the least risky classification, charges a 1.875 percentage point
premium over the quoted prime mortgage rate of 5.875. The interest
rate premium for 30-year, fixed-rate owner-occupied mortgages
increases to 2.25, 2.75, 3.875, and 5.125 percentage points for the
subsequent levels 2 through 5.1
A second stylized fact contrasting personal loan markets and
mortgage markets concerns the relation between credit risk and
rejection rates. In personal loan markets, rejection rates are higher for
low-risk, low interest rate credit. In contrast, rejection rates in
mortgage markets are much higher for subprime lenders than for
prime lenders. For instance, the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) reports that the rejection rate for subprime
mortgage applications was 33 percent while for prime applications, the
rejection rate dropped to 9.1 percent (see Scheessele (2003)).2 Thus,
in personal loan markets rejection rates vary inversely with interest
rates and in mortgage markets rejection rates vary directly with
interest rates.
These differences in operation between personal credit and
mortgage credit markets are likely sufficient to raise concerns about
the role of subprime lending. Concerns have been heightened because,
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based on simplistic and flawed Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
measures, the subprime market appears to be growing dramatically to
almost 9 percent of the total mortgage market, 10.9 percent of
refinances, and 4.9 percent of home purchase originations.
In view of this concern, two natural questions arise. First, is
there a reason to expect, a priori, that the separation of prime and
subprime lenders and positive association between interest and
rejection rates arise naturally in an efficient mortgage market?
Second, does it appear that consumers are sorted into conventional A,
FHA, and subprime mortgage categories based on characteristics that
can be related to credit risk—(i.e., does the interaction of mortgage
markets and borrowers look like risk-based pricing even if that pricing
is based on a few discrete categories rather than a continuum)? In
order to answer the first question, we formulate a simple competitive
model of the mortgage market in which A lenders, which could include
FHA and conventional lenders, are well established and ask when, if,
and how B lenders can enter. Can B lenders successfully compete by
offering a mortgage product that is very close to their A rivals or not?
To answer the second question, we estimate a model of mortgage
choice using a full set of applicant characteristics including credit
score, which is likely to play a crucial role, to determine how well we
can account for the separation of applicants into conventional A, FHA,
and subprime mortgages.

2. A model of underwriting cost, self-selection,
and subprime mortgage credit supply
We begin with a highly stylized statement of the lender’s
problem in a world with only BA^ lenders who underwrite each
applicant and reject all those identified as high risk. The determinants
of mortgage credit supply are identified and, given that higher risks
are rejected, credit rationing arises by assumption.3 Then we allow
type “B” lenders who are willing to consider higher risks than the A
lenders to enter the market. We determine the conditions under which
these lenders are able to enter and earn normal profit. Specifically, we
ask how closely they are able to compete with the A lenders, (i.e., can
the Bs target borrowers with risks just greater than those targeted by
the A lenders, or must entry occur at a discrete distance)? In previous
work on consumer credit, Oreska (1983) demonstrates that a group of
specialized lenders has an advantage over a general-purpose lender.
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We find that, for plausible values of the parameters, and given
substantial principal borrowed and underwriting costs in mortgage
lending, entry occurs at discrete intervals and that the supply of credit
to subprime borrowers is not continuous.

2.1. A market with only type A lenders
Assume that mortgage credit is provided by a large number of
perfectly competitive, zero profit lenders operating under constant
returns to scale, risk neutrality, and common information sets. These
assumptions assure that our results do not arise from the technology
of production or market organization. The mortgage contract is highly
stylized. Loans are for one period with a balloon payment equal to one
plus the interest rate due at the end of one period. For borrowers
accepted in the A market, a payment of IA is due in one year. In cases
of default, the entire payment of principal and interest is lost.
Applicants are only differentiated by the default probability
which equals Di for applicant i. Given that all loans are offered under
the same terms, there is no possibility for negotiation between
borrower and lender. In contrast to the reality of mortgage markets,
loan terms are exogenous. Applicants know both Di and the probability
of acceptance, αA, at A lenders. Di ranges from 0 to Δ, a constant value
strictly less than one. Applicants are uniformly distributed on this
interval. Without loss of generality, we can scale the number of
applicants to equal 1. As noted above, the loan size is also set equal to
unity and we further assume that there is no association between Di
and loan size. Lenders gain information about the Di of an applicant by
exerting underwriting effort. The cost of underwriting is constant for all
applicants and equal to U, of which β is the fraction paid by the
applicant in the form of an application fee, so that (1 - β)U is the cost
borne by the lender for each applicant. We impose upon the model the
stylized fact that application fees cover a fraction, far less than half, of
average underwriting cost.
Lenders have maximum acceptable default probability (D) equal
to Θ for the A market. They accept all applicants whose Di, where i
indicates the individual applicant, is estimated, after underwriting, to
be less than or equal to Θ. For applicants with Di less than or equal to
Θ acceptance is certain, α = 1, regardless of the amount of
underwriting (there is no type II underwriting error). For those with Di
strictly greater than Θ, the probability of acceptance in the A market is
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given by αA = ΓΘ/Di, where Γ is a between zero and unity, and the
maximum value of Di is Δ so that α is bounded from below by ΓΘ/Δ.
Note this implies that, for a given U, the rejection rate rises with Di.
Borrower self-selection is a crucial element of the model. Given
that applicants know, Θ, αA (based on their knowledge of U), and ΙA, it
could be that some high-risk applicants, (i.e., those with Di close to
D), would not apply at A lenders. We ignore this possibility in this
version of the model. But, when a new entrant, the B market lender,
with a cutoff risk level φ strictly greater than Θ tries to enter the
market, we assume that high-risk borrowers will be aware of the terms
offered by this lender and self-select accordingly. In actual practice the
rejection of qualified applicants is an issue of concern to lenders, but
does not alter our fundamental results.
It is useful to begin to solve the problem of a type A lender by
writing the expected profit the firm receives from any individual
applicant, i, as:

(1)
where αA is the acceptance probability; ΙA –Ι is the interest spread over
cost on A mortgages; Di is expected default probability which is equal
to expected loss because the loan amount is normalized to 1; and the
final term is the portion of underwriting cost borne by the lender. Note
that competition and constant returns drive πi to zero for the average
loan, but not for every loan.
Overall profit of the A lender, maximized at zero, is the integral
over all applicants.

(2)
As shown in equation (2), it is useful to partition applicants into two
groups. The first group includes applicants who are always accepted
(Di ≤ Θ, α = 1) and the second group includes applicants who are
accepted a fraction of the time depending on how much the
underwriting standards are violated (Di > Θ, αA is a decreasing
function of Di and increasing in Θ). This will prove very convenient
throughout our analysis.
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Substituting equation (1) into (2), solving for πA, taking definite
integrals, evaluating, and collecting terms gives:

(3)

Solving for ΙA that yields normal profit to A lenders, we find:

(4)
Credit supply implied by equation (4) has an intuitive
explanation. ΙA equals cost of capital plus a markup to cover two costs
of A lending. The first term, which can be written
, reflects expected credit losses due to
default. The numerator is positive and increasing in Δ, and is also
positive and increasing in Θ whenever Γ is less than 1/2. The
denominator is also positive, recalling that Δ/Θ > 1 > Δ > Θ > 0 and
increasing in Δ while the effect of Θ on the denominator is ambiguous.
The second term simply reflects the cost burden of underwriting which
depends on the fraction of all applicants accepted and hence should
rise with Δ and fall with Θ. These two effects reveal the lender’s
problem. Raising Θ has two opposite effects on costs. Increasing Θ
raises expected default losses but it also lowers the fraction of
applicants rejected and hence lowers the expected cost of underwriting
applications.
It is also instructive to consider what happens to ΙA if applicants
self-select so that no one with Di > Θ applies. In this case, πA depends
only on the integral of profit over the 0 to Θ interval and the second
integral is dropped. The result is:

(5)

Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (March 2005): pg. 197-219. DOI. This article is © Springer
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from
Springer.

6

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

The intuition of equation (5) is even more straightforward. Required
interest is equal to cost of funds, Ι, plus average default loss
application cost when there are no rejections.

plus

2.2. Entrance of B lenders in the presence of incumbent
A lenders
As noted above, the B lender has the same constant returns to
scale technology as lender A and entry by B lenders will drive their
economic profit to zero, as it does in the A market. The only
characteristic that differentiates a B lender from an A lender is the
target risk level of applicants. B lenders will tolerate default risk of φ
strictly greater than Θ. Applicants recognize this difference in lending
standards, and all those DΙ with strictly greater than Θ will apply at B.
This assumption is favorable to the entrant, implying that all applicants
switch from A to B when they perceive a higher probability of rejection
at A than B, regardless of the higher cost of borrowing. However, this
is a justifiable assumption given that the goal here is to analyze credit
supply by B under conditions most favorable to the entrant.4 We now
proceed to characterize the nature of the credit supply by such lenders
assuming that A lenders are passive.
Analysis of B lenders begins by writing expected profit from
applicant i as:
(6)
where αB is the acceptance probability; ΙB – Ι is the interest spread
over cost on B mortgages; Di is expected default probability (which is
again set equal to expected loss because the loan amount is
normalized to 1); and the final term is the fraction of underwriting cost
borne by the lender. Note that competition and constant returns drive
to zero.
The overall profit of the B lender, maximized at zero, is the
integral over all applicants, who in this case range from Θ to Δ.

(7)
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As before, it is useful to partition applicants into two groups—
those who meet the underwriting requirements and those who do not.
Those who meet the underwriting requirements are defined as: 0 < Θ
< Di ≤ φ and α = 1. Those who violate the underwriting standards are
defined as: Di > φ and αB is a decreasing function of Di and an
increasing function of φ.
Substituting equation (6) into (7), taking the definite integrals,
evaluating, and collecting terms we have:

(8)
Solving for the value of IB that yields normal profit to B lenders,
we find:

(9)
ΙB must cover the cost of funds Ι, the cost of expected default losses
, and the cost of
underwriting {(Δ –Θ)(1 – β)U}/{φ[1 + Γ(ΙnΔ/φ)] – Θ} . Comparing
the value ΙB implied by equation (9) when φ = Θ, with ΙA given by
equation (4), we find that B lenders will not be able to attract low-risk
applicants away from A lenders, because ΙA is strictly less than ΙB.
Less intuitive is the effect of φ on the supply price of credit, ΙB,
by B lenders. Note that, in the relevant range, the denominator of the
expression involving default and underwriting costs is monotonically
increasing in φ. The effect of φ on the numerator is ambiguous, but,
simulation results shown in Figure 1 indicate that using plausible
values of the parameters, over a significant range of Δ > φ > Θ that
< 0. Thus the supply price of credit from B lenders falls when those
lenders adopt more lenient lending criteria! The reason for this
counterintuitive result is that the increase in the cost of expected
default losses as φ rises is overcome by the fall in the average
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underwriting cost. Average underwriting cost falls as φ rises because
the fraction of applicants accepted increases while total underwriting
cost remains constant. Total underwriting cost is constant because all
potential borrowers will apply regardless of the interest rate charged
by the B lenders. This can be seen in Figure 2, which graphs the
values of the average underwriting cost and the average default cost,
as well as the total average cost of lending. Competition forces B
lenders to set their credit limit, φ, at the point that minimizes the
average cost of lending and the interest rate charged to borrowers.
As long as
< 0, competitive forces will make B lenders
continue to raise φ (i.e., lower underwriting criteria). This leads to our
central result, B lenders will serve a market that is separated in credit
risk from that served by A lenders by a significant gap in
creditworthiness. We could extend this argument further and include a
C lender with similar results. In such a model, the final market
equilibrium would consist of a discrete number of credit alternatives
separated by significant gaps in creditworthiness. Based on this
argument, we conclude that the observed gap between prime and
subprime lenders and the discrete nature of mortgage credit supply is
not inconsistent with a perfectly competitive mortgage market.
Furthermore, our results also generate the second stylized fact
separating personal loan and mortgage lending. Rejection rates are an
increasing function of credit risk in our model because the significant
cost of rejection for mortgage credit, including both the borrower’s
share of underwriting cost and transactions costs of failing to achieve
financing, cause high-risk applicants to self-select away from prime
lenders. The distinct separation of lenders into A and B categories
facilitates this self-selection and leaves prime lenders with lower
rejection rates.
Why is there a contrast between mortgage credit and credit
cards, which provide risk-based pricing more or less continuously? The
credit limit on credit cards serves to limit risk and allows borrowers to
establish creditworthiness while limiting potential loss. Such credit
limits are not appropriate for mortgage lending and are particularly
problematic for consumers who are often seeking cash-out refinancing.
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3. Credit history, mortgage, and demographic
data
Table 1 provides descriptions, mean, minimum, maximum, and
the standard deviation of each variable. Due to data availability, the
data are limited to home purchase mortgages only and do not include
refinances or cash-out refinances. The data in this study came from
four sources. First is the F42 database of the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), which contains detailed loan information and
household characteristics for FHA loans, but no credit history. Second
is a real estate transaction database from Experian, which has detailed
loan information and household identifiers (e.g., address of the
property, amount of the loan, value of the property, loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, and type of loan), but no information on household
characteristics. It contains a census of conventional loans in each
county covered by Experian. This database was built from property
transfer records at the local level. The third source is the individual
borrower’s credit history from Experian. This credit history was
matched to FHA and conventional loans by name, Social Security
number, and property address, with all identifying information
subsequently deleted. The fourth source is HMDA data that were
matched by loan amount, census tract, and lender identification to
conventional Experian loans, to provide income and racial
characteristics of households securing conventional loans.
To separate the subprime and prime conventional loans, a list5
of subprime lenders that report to HMDA created by the Office of
Policy, Development, and Research (PD&R) in HUD (see Scheessele
(1998)) was used. This list was created from trade publications;
therefore, it may not include all subprime lenders that report to HMDA.
In addition, not all subprime lenders report to HMDA. Finally, the list is
unable to separate prime from subprime lending by HMDA reporters
that traditionally originate both types of loans.
The sample includes fixed-rate loans originated between
February 1996 and July 1996, excluding loans for multifamily
properties, refinancing, non-owner occupancy, and loans made to
investors. The loans were matched by Experian to credit history files
archived on March 31, 1996, by address, name, and Social Security
number. This date was chosen to ensure that the credit data did not
include information on the new mortgage, but were as current as
possible. Observations with missing or obvious data coding errors were
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excluded.6 A stratified sampling scheme varied sampling rates
inversely with the FHA market share in each metropolitan statistical
area (MSA). In subsequent statistical analysis, the effects of the
sample stratification were offset by weighting each observation
inversely to its sampling probability. Specifically, conventional loans
were sampled at one-third of the FHA sampling rate.

3.1. Down payment, income, and credit history
Because FHA lending standards require very low down payments
and even insure mortgages with negative equity once insurance
premiums have been financed, we would expect mean FHA LTVs to be
very high. Therefore, it is not surprising that Table 2 shows that the
average down payment for subprime loans was 16.2 percent—well
above the FHA average of 5.7 percent. In addition, prime borrowers
have better payment-to-income ratios (PTIs) and Fair Isaac
Corporation (FICO) credit scores. Note that subprime borrowers lie
between FHA and prime borrowers, on average, in terms of LTV, PTI,
and credit scores.
While FHA serves borrowers who are wealth constrained, as
shown in Table 2, the borrowers using subprime lenders appear to be
more diverse and not as easily characterized. The answer might lie in
the ability of the subprime lender to use discretion and unique lending
programs that may not require that the borrower’s income be verified
or that ignore the standard ratios (LTV or PTI) normally used in the
underwriting process. Although a borrower who does not provide
documentation supporting a steady income stream might not qualify
for prime or FHA financing, this does not imply that the borrower has
little wealth or a poor credit history.

4. Econometric specification and results
The choice model is estimated for a sample of 48,105
households that purchased homes in 39 MSAs from February through
July 1996. Because it can be argued that LTV and mortgage choice are
jointly determined, LTV is estimated using instrumental variables. The
predicted LTVs are then used to generate any variables that are
affected by LTV.7
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4.1. Specification
The following specification, taken from Hendershott et al. (1997)
and Gabriel and Rosenthal (1991), is used to estimate the conditional
prime, FHA, subprime choice model:
Cj = β0 + β1Fj + β2Θj + β3Dj + β4Lj + εj (10)
where Fj is a matrix of financial-monetary variables; Θj is a matrix of
credit history variables; Dj is a matrix of demographic variables; Lj is a
matrix of location-specific variables; and εj is a normally distributed
error term. These matrixes are discussed in turn below, and Table 1
provides summary statistics for each explanatory variable as well as a
brief description and the sources of data.

4.2. Financial-monetary variables
One consideration for the homebuyer is the relative cost of the
mortgage. We focus on the costs to the homebuyer that are derived
from differences in mortgage insurance rates and interest rates. For
each buyer, we construct the present discounted value of interest and
mortgage insurance payments for each mortgage option. For mortgage
insurance fees, we assume payments stop when equity reaches 20
percent and that mortgage payments are made on time with no
house-price appreciation. The borrower’s credit is graded using the
system reported by the Sub-Prime Funding Corp.’s Underwriting
Manual. We rely on credit history variables such as late payment rates
on revolving, installment, and mortgage credit as well as indicators of
judgments, liens, or bankruptcy. In this fashion, we estimate what the
best available interest rate would be from a subprime lender. Using
estimates of interest rate spreads generated by Wall Street firms (see
Weicher (1997)) and the Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation
survey of credit terms and interest rates (see Steinbach (1998)), rates
are increased over prime rates by 200 basis points for B-rated
borrowers, 300 basis points for C-rated borrowers, and 500 basis
points for D-rated borrowers. Because we estimate that more than 95
percent of FHA borrowers financed the upfront mortgage insurance
premiums in 1996, we assume this is true for everyone when
calculating the cost of an FHA-insured mortgage. To measure the
relative cost of prime mortgage insurance versus FHA insurance
(Pc/Pf), we create the ratio of the present discounted value of the
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insurance fees. To measure the relative costs of FHA mortgage
financing and subprime mortgage financing, we create a ratio of the
discounted interest costs for FHA mortgage financing to the discounted
interest costs of subprime mortgage financing (Pf/Ps). The specification
uses these ratios to test the importance of relative prices in the
mortgage choice framework.
A measure of the permanent income (yj) of the individual is
estimated from the cross section of homebuyers and follows the basic
method used by Zorn (1993). A simple model of current income
provides parameter estimates for age variables that are used to
estimate a stream of income through the age 65. This stream is
discounted at the rate of 7 percent and transformed into an annuity (a
coupon bond) that matures when the individual is 65 years old. The
annuity provides the estimated value of the individual’s permanent
income.8
The amount of debt (dj) is created from the credit history data
and is defined as the sum of current revolving debt and non-real
estate installment loans. It is expected that increases in the non-real
estate debt burden will make it more difficult for borrowers to qualify
for the lower cost mortgage.
The value constraint (vj) indicates if the household can purchase
the desired amount of housing or if the household is constrained by
income and/or down payment constraints. In spirit, we follow the
approach of Haurin (1991) and Hendershott et al. (1997).
The utility maximizing amount of housing that a household
would like to own, in the absence of any mortgage financing
constraints, is determined by maximizing a utility function subject to a
budget constraint. This ignores the income and wealth constraints
imposed by lending standards. Following Pennington-Cross and Nichols
(2000), to determine the unconstrained demand, we estimate a
reduced-form, house-price equation over unconstrained homeowners,
defined as households who purchase a home with down payments
greater than or equal to 30 percent of the value of the home, PTIs of
less than 20 percent, and FICO scores above 700. Using the estimated
non-constrained coefficients, the desired house price is calculated for
all remaining homeowners. If the estimated house price is greater than
the actual house price, the homeowner is defined as value constrained
(vj = 1)
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4.3. Credit history variables
A variety of credit measures are tested. The FICO score (fj), one
of the more common aggregate credit measures available, is used as a
summary variable in the analysis.
Using Freddie Mac’s Gold Measure Worksheet, we create the
following more detailed credit history variables:


anyj is 1 if the borrower has any delinquencies or derogatory
information ever or if fewer than five credit lines have ever been
open, otherwise anyj is 0;



revj is 1 if the borrower does not have a revolving credit line or
if total revolving balance is greater than $500, otherwise revj is
0;



fewj is 1 if the borrower has fewer than three credit lines open
ever, otherwise fewj is 0;



delj is 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 if the borrower has respectively 0-10, 1115, 16-40, 41-60, or > 60 percent of credit lines ever 30 days
delinquent or worse;



pubj is 1 if there are any public record items (e.g., bankruptcy)
on the credit report, otherwise pubj is 0; and



inqj is the number of inquiries in the past six months divided by
2.

All of these variables have been designed so that positive values
indicate worse credit history and are expected to increase the
probability of selecting FHA or subprime financing.

4.4. Demographic characteristic variables
Demographic characteristics are represented by dummy
variables indicating borrower race (African-American bj, Indian ij, Asian
aj, Hispanic hj) and marital status (mj). A spatial segregation version of
the Gini coefficient (gj) is also included to measure the extent of racial
segregation in each MSA. A zero value indicates complete racial
integration of the group, while a value of 100 indicates complete
segregation of the racial group.
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4.5. Location variables
A variety of location variables are used to describe the type of
market in which the loan was made. Variables used to describe the
housing market include a dummy variable indicating that the purchase
is made in an “underserved” census tract (unsj), as defined by HUD;
the one-year percent change in Freddie Mac’s reported repeat sales,
home-price index (Δpj); and the standard deviation of Δpj for the last
10 years (σΔpj). Variables from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
reflect the condition of the local labor market and are the average
unemployment rate (uj) for the last five years for the MSA and the
change in the unemployment rate in the last year (Δuj). Other
variables measuring area housing cost and the FHA loan limit include a
dummy variable indicating whether HUD defined the MSA as a highcost area (hcj) and the ratio of FHA’s loan limit divided by DRI’s
estimate of the median house price for the MSA (11/hpj). Indicators of
increased risk associated with a location may increase the probability
that a borrower will use FHA or subprime financing.

4.6. Estimation
Two sets of results are reported. Table 3 provides the estimated
coefficients from the multinomial logit estimation and Table 4 provides
the ordered logit results. The general specification is as follows:
Cj = β0 + β1Fj + β2Θj + β3Dj + β4Lj + εj (11)
where Fj is a matrix of financial-monetary variables; Θj is a matrix of
credit history variables; Dj is a matrix of demographic variables; Lj is a
matrix of location-specific variables; and εj is a normally distributed
error term as discussed above. For each of the estimation techniques
(multinomial and ordered), two specifications are reported—one with
the FICO score and the other with more detailed credit history.
Table 4 shows that ordering is statistically valid (as indicated by
the mu of index), but the multinomial approach has better explanatory
power. The log of likelihood is provided as a relative goodness-of-fit
measure, and t-statistics indicate the significance of each parameter
estimate with critical values of approximately 1.95 and 1.65 for the 5
percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. Tables 5 and 6 provide
estimated marginal effects of the explanatory variables calculated at
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their means. All results discussed refer to the multinomial specification
with FICO scores, unless otherwise noted.
Financial costs play an important and varied role in the choice of
prime, FHA, and subprime mortgage financing. For instance,
homebuyers who are value-constrained are more likely to use FHA
than prime and subprime financing. Borrowers with higher permanent
income are more likely to use prime financing, while borrowers
carrying a lot of non-real estate debt are more likely to use FHA and
subprime financing. But for all measures, the magnitude of the
responses is always substantially higher for FHA and conventional
choices. For instance, Figure 3 shows that as the amount of non-real
estate debt increases from the mean of $10,842 to $48,000, the
probability of selecting prime financing drops from 80 percent to 56
percent, while the probability of selecting FHA increases from 18
percent to 42 percent, and subprime decreases from 1.77 percent to
1.50 percent.
As the cost of conventional mortgage insurance increases
relative to FHA mortgage insurance, borrowers tend to switch to FHAinsured mortgages. This result is consistent for both the multinomial
and ordered logit models. But the result is not so consistent for the
relative cost of FHA and subprime lending.
The ordered logit estimation finds the expected result that, as
the interest cost of FHA financing increases relative to subprime,
borrowers are more likely to use subprime financing and less likely to
use FHA financing. But the multinomial estimates find the opposite
result. In addition, when the full array of credit history indicators is
included, the relative cost of FHA and subprime is no longer
statistically significant. This may indicate measurement problems in
the subprime price variation or that some households that use
subprime lenders cannot respond to prices because they are being
constrained by unobserved aspects of their credit history or other nonprice rationing mechanisms.
While Figure 3 shows that the amount of non-real estate debt
can more than double the probability of using FHA, the changes in
credit score dwarf this effect. Figure 4 shows that a decrease in a
borrower’s FICO score—from a mean of 693 to 406, the lowest
recorded score—increases the probability of choosing FHA from 20
percent to 68 percent. Over the same range, the probability of using
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prime financing decreases from 78 percent to 28 percent, and
increases for subprime—from 1.77 percent to 3.10 percent.
The detailed credit history variables show that FHA is a more
likely choice for borrowers with poor credit, no matter how their credit
history is tarnished. In contrast, the impact of credit history is more
varied on the use of subprime lending. Only two of the six indicators of
credit history have the anticipated sign and significance. For instance,
if the borrower has ever had any delinquencies the probability of using
subprime decreases. But, the results for the FICO credit score and
indicators of the level of delinquency and public record items are very
similar for both FHA and subprime mortgage selection. In fact,
borrowers who are more than 30 days late on 60 percent or more of
their loans are more than twice as likely to use FHA or subprime
financing, as compared with those who are at least 30 days delinquent
on less than 10 percent of their loans.
The borrower demographic results indicate that (even after
controlling for borrower income, debt, and credit history), racial
groups behave differently. For instance, African-Americans, Indians,
and Hispanics are more likely to use FHA and subprime financing than
Whites. In contrast, Asians are less likely to use FHA, but more likely
to use subprime financing than Whites.
Location plays a role in mortgage choice. In general, prime
financing is more likely when house prices are increasing or when the
unemployment rate is decreasing in the MSA. In contrast, while the
choice of prime and FHA financing is unresponsive to the volatility of
house prices ( ), the probability of choosing subprime financing
increases from 1.77 percent to 2.9 percent when the volatility is
increased from the mean of 2.3 percent to the maximum of 5.8
percent.
In locations considered high cost, the probability of choosing
FHA is 6 percent higher. In addition, in areas where FHA sets the loan
limit so that a large portion of the market is eligible for FHA
mortgages, the probability of using FHA also increases. This is true
despite the fact that this study includes only loans that are FHA eligible
(i.e., loans under the FHA loan limit). These results support the
hypothesis that, when the FHA market is defined as only the bottom
part of the market, it may have difficulty generating enough business
for lenders to overcome the fixed costs of learning and staying up with
FHA programs and/or that it may be difficult to find homes that meet
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FHA’s habitability requirements in the lowest priced portion of the
market.

5. Conclusions
Unlike other forms of credit, such as credit cards, risk-based
pricing has not provided a smooth continuum of mortgage costs.
Instead, the mortgage market is segmented into discrete risk
classifications. Furthermore, rejection rates vary directly with interest
rates in the mortgage market and inversely in the personal loan
market. The theoretical model in this paper demonstrates that the
discrete levels of mortgage credit supply and the positive relationship
between interest and rejection rates arise from a separating
equilibrium in the mortgage market. This separation does not rely on
technology (returns to scale) or market power, but the simple
observation that processing an application through the underwriting
process is costly, and is only partially covered by the application fee.
When a subprime lender tries to locate too close (in credit risk space)
to prime lenders, the application costs overwhelm credit losses to the
point where it is less costly to lower credit standards and accept a
higher proportion of applicants. Equilibrium requires that the subprime
lender move a substantial distance from prime lenders, thus leading to
a discrete and segmented mortgage market.
The econometric results show that the use of prime, FHA, and
subprime lending is related to indicators of creditworthiness. For
instance, credit history plays an important role in the selection of
prime, FHA, or subprime mortgage financing. Other measures of credit
risk, such as income, non-real estate debt, and value constraints are
also very important determinants of FHA use, but play a smaller role in
determining the use of subprime financing.
Sensitivity tests show that no one indicator can make subprime
a likely choice for any household. For subprime to be a likely choice
requires that all of a household’s risk indicators must be very negative.
It also may be very difficult to identify the characteristics that make
subprime lending a viable option to borrowers because not all
underwriting criteria are captured in the estimation, and the sample of
subprime loans is quite small. For instance, subprime lenders can
make loans to people who do not want to document their income or
source of down payment. But our results do indicate that a homebuyer
is more likely to use subprime lending when risk indicators such as
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credit history and location are worse. Future research on subprime
loan choice would benefit if loans could be characterized based on the
total cost borne by the applicant, or borrower, instead of a simple
lender classification.
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Notes
1. Downloaded from Indymacbank.com on 11/19/02 for 30-year, fixed-rate
owner-occupied mortgages.
2. HUD creates a list of subprime specialists that is used to define loans as
prime or subprime. These figures must be viewed with some
skepticism because reporting to HMDA has changed over time
(mortgage bankers especially) and acquisitions of subprime lenders by
depositories in the 1990s transformed them into mortgage banking
subsidiaries. These factors are likely to lead to an over-statement of
subprime growth and make it very difficult to accurately measure the
size of the subprime market. In addition, it is clear that the HMDA
approach does not include all subprime loans. For instance, in 1995
the Inside Mortgage Finance estimate of subprime market share, using
the dollar value of loans, is almost 7 percentage points higher than the
HMDA estimates in 1995. By 1998, this spread had decreased to just
over one point. This may indicate changing reporting in HMDA,
changing methodology by Inside Mortgage Finance, or the changing
market structure of subprime lending.
3. In this paper, risk is defined solely from the perspective of credit risk due
to default. The value of a mortgage is determined by the expected
cash flow from the instrument and variance of the expected cash flow.
Therefore, prepayments of mortgages also affect the value of a
mortgage whether the prepayment is due to changes in interest rates
or other mobility issues. See Pennington-Cross (2003) for a discussion
of the prepayment characteristics of subprime mortgages.
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4. There are typically two sets of underwriting costs. The first set of costs,
which has fairly low marginal costs, includes the costs of automated
underwriting. The second set of costs, which is labor and time
intensive, is the process of verifying income, assets, employment, and
the physical state of the property.
5. Office of Policy, Development, and Research (PD&R) in the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
6. Incomplete data was defined as having missing values for one or more of
the key variables used in the analysis: mortgage amount; property
value; date of closing for the mortgage; interest rate; term of the
mortgage; indicator for a first-time home buyer; purpose of the loan;
and the name, Social Security number, income, and assets of the
borrower. Some variables were not missing data, but instead
contained data entry errors (e.g., LTVs greater than 300 percent or
income of $20). The following set of conditions was used to identify
any observations containing obvious data errors: FICO scores greater
than 850 or less than 360; LTV greater than 110 percent or less than
20 percent; annual income of borrower greater than $1,000,000 or
less than $1,000; age of borrower less than 18; and a loan amount
less than $5,000.
7. See Pennington-Cross and Nichols (2000) for details of the estimation
technique.
8. Since we do not have data on assets, income is estimated up to retirement
age or 65 years of age and it is assumed that there is no par or face
value payment at term (i.e., no retirement savings). A log-log form is
used. See Pennington-Cross and Nichols for more details.
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Appendix
Appendix 1. Matching experian real estate transaction to HMDA data
Two key variables—race and income of borrower—were added to the
Experian non-FHA home-purchase information by finding the corresponding
mortgages in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database.
The Experian database includes all non-FHA home-purchase mortgages
made during the months of February 1996 through July 1996. HMDA and
Experian use different sets of lender codes, so a crosswalk of HMDA and
Experian lender codes is created. Lender codes (HMDA and Experian) were
considered to be equivalent for a pair of lenders when, at least five times in a
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single county, a single loan in the Experian file for a given lender code and a
single loan in the HMDA file for a given lender code had the same loan
amount within the same census tract. After this process, Experian loans that
had multiple matches with HMDA were visually inspected (sorted by ZIP Code
of lender and name of lender) to identify loans with the equivalent lender
names. This crosswalk between HMDA and Experian lender codes was then
used to match HMDA and Experian loan records. A loan was considered
matched if it was the only loan that had the same loan amount and the same
lender within a census tract.
Appendix 2. Calculation of user cost measure
The user cost of ownership is defined as follows:
(12)
where ty is the marginal income tax rate; r is the nominal mortgage rate (FHA
rate is available on sample records and national average for the month of
origination is used for conventional loans); tp is the marginal property tax
rate; πe is the expected inflation in housing prices which is assumed to be
myopic; δ is the economic depreciation rate which is defined as g * d; g is the
structure-land ratio which is assumed to be 0.83; d is the depreciation rate,
which is assumed to be 0.017 following Linneman and Wachter (1989); and s,
m, and j indicate that the variable is geographically defined at the state, MSA,
and individual level, respectively.
For FHA borrowers, the marginal income tax rate (ty) is estimated
based on the characteristics of each individual. Each borrower is assigned to
one of three filing status categories—married, single, or head of household.
All married persons are assumed to file jointly; non-married persons with
dependents are assumed to file as head of household; and non-married
persons with no dependents are assumed to file as single. Income levels are
reduced by the deductions allowed by filing status, number of dependents,
mortgage interest payments, and the estimated amount of state taxes paid.
State taxes are based on the same information as federal taxes and the tax
schedule of the state of residence. Total itemized deductions are defined as
the sum of the interest rate deduction and state taxes. The federal taxable
income is calculated using the minimum of itemized or standard deductions.
In addition, a deduction of $10,000 is applied to all retirees (age greater than
or equal to 65) to account for the non-taxable portion of Social Security
benefits. Once the total federal taxable income is defined, the marginal tax
rate is calculated using the appropriate schedule for the filing status of the
borrower.
To estimate the marginal income tax rate of individuals buying nonFHA homes, we use the Current Population Survey (CPS)-reported federal tax
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rate average by income class groups for homeowners. Property tax rates ( )
are created at the state level for the last year available (1994), using state
and local property tax revenues and estimates of the total valuation of
property:

(13)
where Ts is the property tax revenue for the state and local governments; KHs
is the number of existing houses; PHs is the median price of existing homes;
and s is the state. Data on tax revenue are collected by DRI and are available
from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Government
Finances. The number of existing homes is collected from DRI and is available
from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Median house
prices were estimated by DRI and are derived from the Federal Housing
Finance Board Mortgage Interest Rate Survey and median prices released by
the National Association of Realtors.
Figure 1: Market Segmentation

The following parameters are used to create the stimulations in Figure 1 and 2: Δ =
0.2; Θ = 0.05; Γ = 1; b = 0.2; U = 0.05; and Ι = 1.05.
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Figure 2: Average Cost Curves

The following parameters are used to create the stimulations in Figure 1 and 2: Δ =
0.2; Θ = 0.05; Γ = 1; b = 0.2; U = 0.05; and Ι = 1.05.
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Figure 3: Mortgage Choice and Non-real Estate Debt
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Figure 4: Mortgage Choice and FICO Score
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Table 1: Data Description

Notes: Explanation of Source: 1 = loan level data from the Experian transaction
database as matched to HMDA and FHA’s F42 database; 2 = Experian credit history
reports; 3 = United States Census Bureau; 4 = general HUD sources; 5 = Freddie
Mac; 6 = United States Bureau of Labor Statistics; 7 = Standard and Poor’s DRI; a
Value derived from auxiliary regression results.
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Table 2: Mean Ratios and Scores by Mortgage Choice

Table 3: Multinomial Logit Model of Mortgage Choice
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Table 4: Ordered Logit Model of Mortgage Choice
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Table 5: Marginal Probabilities: Specification I
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Table 6: Marginal Probabilities: Specification II
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